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The passage of the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) in 1991 indicated
that the neo-liberal assault on the welfarist consensus that dominated New
Zealand's parliamentary politics since 1943 was moving into its final stage.
Claims of the success of the ECA from government and business circles
have been quite staggering. The ECA, they claim, has been responsible for
lowering unemployment, promoting growth, reducing employer costs, reducing wage inflation, and reducing strikes. A modem day miracle! The effect of the ECA on New Zealand workers and their organizations has not received anything close to the same attention. The workers' story is about
increasing casualization, the destruction of collective bargaining, lowering
of real wages, and massive deunionization. That story is also about the different responses of organized labor to the monetarist assault.
This Paper has two parts. The first describes the trade union landscape
immediately prior to and following the passage of the ECA. It also describes
the formation and response of the New Zealand Trade Union Federation
(TUF) to the post-ECA industrial world. The second part is derived from a
recent speech of Maxine Gay to a seminar on the role and usefulness of the
New Zealand Employment Court. This form of presentation gives readers
both a background to the formation of the TUF and a feel of the culture,
passion, and at times irreverence of the organization and its new President.
The TUF seeks to give voice to blue collar manufacturing, construction,
transport, primary production, and service sector workers as they struggle
for their survival in the hostile environment of the ECA and all the other aspects of full-blown economic liberalism that the New Zealand experiment
* President, New Zealand Trade Union Federation. Ms. Gay has many years of experienc e in the trade union movement as an activist, delegate, and full-time official. She was
founding General Secretary of the New Zealand Trade Union Federation.
** University of Queensland / New Zealand Trade Union Federation. Mr. MacLean has
worked in student and trade unions and other community groups for the last fifteen years. He
is a Wellington-based cultural historian and analyst, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997

1

46CaliforniaCALIFORNIA
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Western International
Law
Journal, Vol. 28, LAW
No. 1 [1997],
Art. 6 [Vol. 28
contains. The change in tone of the second part reflects the intensity of current concerns, presenting the passage of the Act and the formation of the
TUF in a way that reveals a greater distance from the passions of the day.
PART I
THE ECA AND THE NEW ZEALAND TRADE UNION FEDERATION

In 1993, two years after the enactment of the ECA, the New Zealand
Trade Union Federation (TUF) was formed following growing discontent
with the strategic approach adopted by the New Zealand Council of Trade
Unions (CTU). The CTU and some key members, such as the Engineers
Union, pursued what they claimed to be a realistic response to existing conditions. In reality, this response has embodied a wholesale adoption of business unionism and employer partnership rhetoric rather than tactics based on
the need for independent workers' organizations representing the needs of
workers, especially where those needs are in conflict with those of employers. A number of unions rejected these accommodationist policies and
formed the TUF to promote a different model for New Zealand unionism.
This vision includes expanding workers' organization, building alliances
with other disadvantaged and marginalized social sectors, confronting
globalization and corporate power, and promoting an independent workers'
voice.
The CTU's compromised political position had been obvious since its
formation in 1987, as the trade union movement became increasingly reliant
on the Labour Party and a statist response to issues rather than a clear workers' struggle orientation. This statist orientation was characterized by increasing reliance on parliamentary and state regulation, lobbying, and negotiation rather than direct action and the organization of a workers'
movement. Despite the suffering of their members, the trade union movement was notably silent during Labour's structural adjustment program of
the 1980s. Jane Kelsey has outlined the key elements of this program.' She
stresses the changes in fiscal and monetary policy, including currency devaluation and monetarist anti-inflationary policy; the removal of export and
domestic subsidies; active pursuit of free trade programs and objectives; and
a shift from direct to indirect taxation.' Associated with these changes came
the corporatization and often privatization of state activities with, at the very
minimum, a widespread commercialization of state functions.3 Related to
this commercialization of state functions, government departments were
split into policy and operational agencies with an increasing emphasis on
commercial overtones. The final steps came with cuts to welfare benefits
1. JANE KELSEY, THE NEw ZEALAND ExPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT? 1-11 (1995).

2. Id
3. lId
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and a systematic application of policies assuming widespread charitable assistance justified by the argument that in many cases recipients of state support secured considerable private gain. These changes were the most blatant
articulation of increasing dependence on women and Maori communities to
provide social support. In the face of these attacks on workers, opposition
was led by community groups, unemployed workers, and other increasingly
dispossessed social sectors.
The trade union movement was able to use its influence in the Labour
Party and in Labour's parliamentary caucus to ensure that labor market reform did not include the end of State-sponsored unionism. It responded to
Labour's increasingly precarious political position in 1989/90 by negotiatijig an Australian Accord-like wages compact. This agreement limited
workers' pay raises to 2 percent at a time when inflation was significantly
higher. Although receiving millions of dollars of State money for trade union education during this period, the union movement did little as a whole to
educate and organize against the neo-liberal policies of the Labour Government or to prepare workers for the likely onslaught from the National Party.
The result was that, in 1990, the election victory by the conservative National Party left workers and unions facing an even more hostile government. The movement was woefully unprepared, unable and unwilling to resist the next wave of attacks on workers. Having politically and structurally
isolated itself from workers during the 1980s, the CTU nationally did little
if anything to organize resistance to the severe benefit cuts the National
Government introduced in December 1990. The CTU left this job to unemployed workers, some unions,4 and other beneficiaries' groups. However,
the real crime during this period was the CTU's refusal to campaign actively
to defeat the Employment Contracts Bill. Although token opposition was
mounted, an active campaign would have involved, in many people's minds,
a general strike and an on-going campaign of mass struggle.
The National Government's plans regarding industrial relations reform
were clear during the lead up to the 1990 election-it intended the complete
deregulation of the labor market. The CTU, having committed itself to its
compromising compact with Labour, could not organize an activist worker's
movement at the same time. This predicament left the CTU tactically and
politically unprepared for a struggle around the ECA. Furthermore, years of
compromise with Labour's attacks on working people, through the structural adjustment program, made it difficult for the CTU even to appear as an
effective opposition and thus gain credibility among workers.'
Otago University Political Studies lecturer Brian Roper has analyzed
4. For example, the Clerical Workers and Service Workers' Unions, and the Auckland
and Manawatu District Councils of the CTU.
5. For an outline of these events, see Ellen Dannin, We Can't Overcome? A Case Study
of Freedom of Contract and Labour Law Reform, 16 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT
& LAB. L. 1 (1995), and ELLEN DANNN, WORKING FREE: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF NEW
ZEALAND'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS ACT (1997).
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the position adopted by the CTU leadership in terms of the theory of contingent bureaucratic conservatism, while Sarah Heal has specifically applied
this approach to a consideration of the CTU response to the ECA. Although
both Roper and Heal stress the need to consider the specific circumstances
of any political or industrial struggle, they also urge the inclusion of the
"contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time union officials.""
Since the ECA's enactment, the CTU leadership has continually failed
to lead workers and to confront the policies that have caused so much damage. In terms of industrial responses, the CTU has emphasized the need for
negotiation and compromise, while officials made concessions to ensure a
union role as bargaining agent. Although the ECA denies unions a specific
role in industrial relations, the CTU has been able to lay claim to an active
role in the new industrial system by facilitating the introduction of employer
plans. Overall, the CTU has failed to coordinate action against a range of
attacks from militant employers and governments. In its response to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill in December 1990, the CTU
failed to coordinate a general strike despite good evidence of overwhelming
working class support for direct action. It chose, instead, to produce leaflets
and press releases stressing workers' "powerlessness" and to advocate compromise and negotiation.
The CTU's isolation from rank and file membership along with its
compromised political role during the fourth Labour Government, both
factors explained by the notion of contingent bureaucratic conservatism, led
the national body to seek negotiation on and amendment of the Bill rather
than a strategy centered on opposition and defeat. Heal argues that a key
factor in the final form of the ECA was the "capitulation of the trade union
leadership to the wishes of employers and the National Government."8 The
CTU's leadership failure was a major factor, as was the economic crisis and
the shift in the balance of political and ideological power. Furthermore, the
CTU did not simply display the characteristics of a contingently conservative bureaucratic leadership in regard to the ECA. In fact, the CTU had
adopted a conciliatory approach from the outset and in negotiations over the
Compact (1989) had proceeded in an undemocratic manner by failing to involve the rank and file in decision-making and keeping many of the specifics isolated from even the National Executive.

6. Brian S. Roper, Leading From the Rear? A Theoretical Analysis of the Contingent
BureaucraticConservatism of the NZCTU Leadership, in Labour, Employment and Work in
New Zealand 1994: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference, Nov. 24 & 25, 1994, 265-73
(Philip S. Morrison ed., 1995); Sarah Heal, The Struggle Over the Employment Contracts
Act, 1987-1991, in Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994: Proceedings of the
Sixth Conference, Nov. 24 & 25, 1994, 274-80 (Philip S. Morrison ed., 1995).
7. Roper, supra note 6, at 269.
8. Heal, supra note 6, at 274.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/6

4

19971
Gay
and MacLean: Six
Years Hard
Labor:
Workers
and Unions
under the Employment Con
WORKERS
AND
UNIONS
UNDER
THE ECA
Special Affiliates Conference
The event which best captures and has come to symbolize the CTU's
failure of leadership came in 1990/91 with the struggle over the introduction
of the ECA. Most criticism has focused on the CTU's refusal to call a national strike. The national body persistently refused even to consider this
tactic despite strong rank and file support for such action. Not only did it
fail to take the leadership, but it refused to act according to the popular
votes of its constituent members. This criticism turns around the crucial call
for a general strike at a special affiliates conference held on April 18, 1991,
less than a month before the Bill was finally passed. This call was defeated
as a result of opposition by public sector unions, including teacher unions,
the Public Service Association, and the Engineers. These unions voted
against a general strike even where their own memberships overwhelmingly
supported such action. Criticism of refusal to support a general strike gained
support when the compromise "National Day of Action" held on April 30,
1991, drew mass support with over 60,000 protesters taking part. This special affiliates conference is a crucial point in subsequent trade union organization and a significant factor in the development of the TUF.
The conference was called to discuss a CTU National Executive proposal for a National Day of Action on April 30, 1991, but soon changed
when Service Workers' Federation Secretary (and now Labour MP) Rick
Barker moved an amendment calling for a 24-hour general strike after
unanimous calls for such a tactic occurred at Service Workers' stopwork
meetings. Barker's Amendment came after proposals from the Tramways
and Journalists Unions for "a campaign of mass action to oppose the Employment Contracts Bill until it is withdrawn or defeated." 9 The Barker
Amendment was defeated, drawing 43 percent of a card vote (weighted for
union membership numbers). The resolution was opposed by the public
sector unions, the Engineers Union, and Financial Sector Union. The general strike call, however, had the active support of a number of unions outside the CTU, including the powerful Seafarers and Manufacturing and
Construction Workers Unions. More important, a number of union officials
voted against the decisions of their members to oppose the general strike
call. The Nurses Organisation, for instance, opposed the Barker Amendment, even though 87 percent of Nurses Association members (the larger of
the two elements of the Nurses Organisation) had supported a general
strike.'0 Union officials tended to argue that there had been no specific debate among their membership for a general strike, whereas the high level of
support for general strike in stopwork meetings nationwide suggests that
leadership should have been aware of the feeling (even if no ballot had been
taken). The CTU leadership had made it clear they did not support a general
9. Heal, supra note 6, at 277.
10. Id.
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strike and would not be leading the call for such action. Speaking in the
South Island West Coast town of Hokitika on April 15, 1991, CTU President Ken Douglas had said that workers would be "waiting forever" for him
to call for a general strike and that there has to be "an answer other than just
leading a protest parade."'
The CTU's refusal to lead a general strike and to demonstrate support
for serious opposition to the ECA was a betrayal of its role at a crucial time.
This betrayal was compounded by other (in)actions. The CTU leadership
stressed compromise and had great faith in its negotiating ability, as seen in
the approach of advocating modification rather than defeat of the Bill. The
attitudes of the CTU leadership are summed up by Steph Breen of the
Nurses Organization and John McKeefry of the Engineers Union. Breen argued: 'There's a difference between idealism and pragmatism and realism:
about who's got their feet on the ground and who's just standing up waving
the banner. If you're going to say we're going to do this you've got to be
able to deliver or otherwise your credibility goes down the tubes."' 2 McKeefry adopts a far more compromised and concessionary approach, suggesting
a much stronger sense of bureaucratic conservatism, when he argues the
following:
They (National) were going to do it, we'd best not enrage them further,
we'd best not take that option and what we'd best do is prepare a very
well-researched submission arguing for the alternative which we needed
to have a coordinated labour relations policy across the country to ensure
that standards are kept up and that the emphasis is not on short-term wage
cutting solutions but investing in training and skills and things like that
and we'd best educate our own employees."
McKeefry's position that it would not be in unions' interests nor serve
their members' interests to "enrage" the government or its allies seriously
compromises the power of unions to support workers. This response, along
with corporate unionism, where unions operate as businesses rather than
sites of working class struggle, is now embodied in the Engineers Union's
4
policy and approaches, as well as in the positions adopted by the CTU.
Ken Douglas, CTU President, explicitly advocates this employer partnership role. He justifies his advocacy of workplace reform as a means of

11. Id. at276.
12. Id. at 278.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. This position is articulated and justified in Ken Douglas, Organising Workers: The
Effects of the Act on the Council of Trade Unions and its Membership, in EMPLOYMENT
CoNTRAcrs: NEw ZEALAND EXPERIENCES 197-209 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993); Rosalie
Webster, Operating Under the Act: One Union's Experience, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRAcTs:
NEw ZEALAND EXPERIENCES 237-50 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993); Suze Wilson, Organized Labour in the Employment ContractsEnvironment, in Labour, Employment and Work in
New Zealand 1994: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference, Nov. 24 & 25, 1994, 281-84
(Philip S. Morrison ed., 1995).
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building a more cooperative industrial relations environment by advancing
the argument that union involvement is crucial to ensure the desired outcomes from quality improvement programs. 5 Little in Douglas' case suggests that desirable outcomes for workers and employers are different. He
builds his case for this as a modem approach to changed circumstances by
portraying trade unions as basically conservative institutions resisting
change merely for the sake of the protection of their own power. 6 He says:
Cut off from decision-making responsibilities, unions focused on protecting workers from exploitation by using Taylorism as a base for shop floor
power. Multiple job classifications were negotiated, wages were linked to
the job instead of a worker's skills and a whole structure of job control
unionism was born which gave unions a negative sanction against management but not a positive power to influence operations. Assisted by the
wider role of regulation within the economy, unions were encouraged to
believe that they were able to exercise a power of veto over all change in
the workplace. This has led, in my view, to an ossification of thinking
within the trade union movement and trade unions in particular, that has
turned unions, which grew and developed as organizations for change, to
protectors of the status quo. t7
In this case, Douglas is arguing that the problem with unions is that
they have resisted employers' attempts to increase their profits at the expense of workers' incomes.
The response required of the CTU,in Douglas's view, is one of its own
re-education in issues of workplace reform and methods of work in consultative systems, clarification of employer plans and objectives, identification
of union and labor movement needs in workplace reform, and the development of strategic activities to "produce the outcomes to achieve workplace
reform and the productivity gains that will be made." 8 Douglas appears to
advocate the position that the role of the CTU is to identify union needs but
then to develop a strategy that will implement the bosses' objectives. The
TUF sees this as a flawed approach, premised on the notion that workers
and employers have common interests and seek the same, or at least broadly
similar, outcomes from workplace reform and other industrial relations
changes.
Employer Partnership
This argument that unions are failing in the new industrial environment
is also advanced by former Engineers Union organizer, Suze Wilson." She
15. Douglas, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 206-07.
18. Id. at 209.
19. Suze Wilson, Organized Labour in the Employment Contracts Environment, in Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference,
Nov. 24 & 25, 1994, 281-84 (Philip S. Morrison ed., 1995).
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asserts that unions are not well prepared or acting well under the new regime and are failing to represent any workers effectively as well as exposing
the shallowness of their organization as based on a narrow range of approaches and tactics."0 Furthermore, she contends, many unions have also
failed to come to grips with the new environment. Like Douglas, she paints
a picture of an ossified labor movement stuck in the past: "[T]he left/labour
movement remains paralysed by immature debate about collaboration and
the scope of the welfare state while workers remain exposed to, and poorly
equipped for, the rigours of the market economy."'" Over the years, the Engineers Union has responded to this exposure to market demands by implementing programs such as teams that direct workers' organizational power
to the service of the employer rather than organizing for workers' objectives. Management at the Nissan plant in South Auckland implemented the
team plan 1988 and 1989 with the active support of the Engineers Unionand over the opposition of other unions on the site. Similar programs have
been introduced with the collaboration of the Engineers at Fisher and
Paykel, New Zealand's largest appliance manufacturer. This workplace reform has become a tool which employers use to undermine workers' organization.
The most disturbing aspect of the reform process is that trade unions
have actively aided this employer strategy. Janet Sayers, lecturer in Human
Resource Management, criticizes claims that Total Quality Managementtype schemes (such as those at Nissan and at Fisher and Paykel) are a sign
that the ECA is working because these schemes actually began before the
ECA.' While she is correct in this chronology, the ECA is an ideological
extension of the 1987 Labour Relations Act and an integral part of the
structural adjustment program, meaning that these types of schemes should
be seen as a sign of the Act's acceptance and implementation. The ECA did
not in itself represent a fundamental rupture in the direction of industrial
relations policy, but is the final step in both the structural adjustment program and the culmination of changes since 1968.2" The ECA facilitated the
intensification of workplace reform rhetoric and its associated rates of exploitation, which is borne out by the experience of unions that see teamwork
rhetoric increasing. This rhetoric is seen in attempts to build company loyalty and cut costs or increase the rate of exploitation, as a path to reducing
union influence.'
20. Id. at 281.
21. Id. at 283.
22. Janet Sayers, Women, the Employment Contracts Act, and Labour Flexibility, in
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEw ZEALAND EXPERENCES 210-23 (Raymond Harbridge ed.,
1993).
23. See Kevin Hince, From William Pember Reeves to William Francis Birch: From
Conciliation to Contracts, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEw ZEALAND ExPERIENCES 7-12

(Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993).
24. See, e.g., NAnONAL DISTRIBUrION
THE ECA (Auckland, 1997).

UNION, SHORTCHANGED: RErAIL WORKERS AND
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These strategies of compromise have done little to extend the reach of
trade unions or to expand their membership base. The growth of the Engineers Union, for instance, has been almost exclusively due to mergers with
other unions, notably the Printers Union, picking up members from the collapsed Communication and Energy Workers Union and by actively
"poaching" other unions' members. This "poaching" has been most pronounced in the food and beverage and wood industries. The Engineers Union has made no secret of the fact that it intends to be the major union in
both these sectors. Like any good corporation, it has identified that these are
the growth areas, as compared to the shrinking metals sector which it traditionally covered. That the unions with the traditional coverage in food and
wood have rejected amalgamation with the Engineers Union has simply
given the signal to the Engineers to attempt to poach these already organized workers. Poaching tactics have included offers of discounted pay, TV
subscriptions, and airfares for joining the Engineers Union. Where these
tactics have not worked, the Engineers have recruited full-time organizers
from among job delegates on sites they wish to poach, with the expectation
that the rest of the workforce, will follow. Even this tactic has met with only
partial success for the Engineers Union and disaster for the workers. A typical example of this is the Tegel Chicken site that had almost 100 percent
membership in the United Food and Beverage Union before the poaching
started. Now 30 percent belong to the Food Union, 30 percent belong to the
Engineers Union, and 40 percent have become de-unionized. The employers, of course, are delighted with this scenario. There is little evidence of onthe-ground organizing by the Engineers Union in new sites or with new
groups of workers. Approaches such as this do not extend the ambit of union organization beyond the core workforce, leaving marginal and other difficult-to-organize workers exposed to the tactics of employers, a decline in
their working conditions, and the vagaries and insecurities of existence in
secondary labor markets.
In addition to tactics which undermine the position of the hard-toorganize, such as a shift away from a focus on penalty rates, the CTU has
intervened on a number of occasions since 1991 to force union amalgamations that further threaten the position of those in the secondary labor market. The most notable example of this was the case of the New Zealand
Clerical Workers' Union (CWU)Y The CWU was a union with a high proportion of women members covering a range of administrative and office
occupations in a wide range of worksites and industries. The CWU was
wound up in a series of steps in late 1991 and early 1992. The union had lost
membership due to the ECA. The union's central district lost 15 percent of
its membership between May and September 1991, the first four months of
the Act. This rate is reportedly lower than the membership loss suffered by
the Engineers Union in the same region during the same period. The deci25. Maxine Gay was a Clerical Workers Union organizer from 1985 to 1992.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997

9

Western International
Journal, Vol. 28, LAW
No. 1 JOURNAL
[1997], Art. 6 [Vol. 28
INTERNATIONAL
WESTERNLaw
54CaliforniaCALIFORNIA

sion to wind up the CWU was not taken as a result of the ECA or because
this membership loss had made the union unviable, but rather because the
CTU decided that the union, as an occupational rather than an industrial
grouping, should not continue to exist in the new industrial environment.
The primary beneficiaries of the CWU's dissolution were the Finance Sector Union (FINSEC) and the Engineers Union, both of which had lost significant numbers of members.26
A more important concern than the self-serving machinations of CTU
affiliates desperate to maintain membership numbers has been the effect of
the CWU's dissolution on the extent of union organization and the range of
issues at the core of organizing attempts. In the central region, covering the
lower North Island and upper South Island, the CWU was one of the few
unions with a significant number of organizers in regional areas. FINSEC,
for instance, which took over responsibility for clerical workers in the banks
and other finance houses, had no organizers in the region outside Wellington. Thus, those clerical workers outside that core area have lost their local
representation and regular contact with union organizations. In addition, the
move from occupational to industrial organization cost many clerical workers their specialist representation. Clerical workers became part of an organization with a number of other occupational groups with the result that
the specific concerns of clerical workers became submerged in the concerns
of a larger segment of the enterprise's workforce. The concerns of the small
number of clerical workers in large factories have become lost in the issues
of the much larger workforces on the factory floor. It is not surprising,
therefore, that rather than strengthening the unionization of clerical workers,
the destruction of the CWU led instead to much greater de-unionization than
if the CWU had continued to exist. Equally importantly, the CWU had led
the way on issues such as pay equity (comparable worth), women's involvement in trade unions, and action against sexual harassment. The collapse of the CWU has been a major setback for organization on these crucial
issues.
New Zealand Trade Union Federation
The CTU leadership's ongoing resistance to an activist response to the
ECA, coupled with its belief that the Bill could not be defeated, have created a major source of stress within the movement. A number of private
sector unions, such as the Seafarers and the Manufacturing and Construction
Workers Union-stalwarts of the now defunct Federation of Labourdeclined to join the CTU after it was formed from the merger of the FOL
and the Combined State Unions in 1987. Even at that time, these unions
recognized a fundamental political and economic rupture between the inter26. See Births, Deaths & Marriages, LABOUR NOTEs 4, Oct. 1991, at 12; Robert Reid,
De-unionising Clerical Workers, LABOUR NoTEs 5, Mar. 1992, at 4, 7.
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ests of their members and those of workers in the core labor market represented by the majority of CTU constituent unions. The struggle over the
ECA within the CTU did not cause these stresses, but it did accentuate and
exacerbate them. A number of unions, such as the Manufacturing and Construction Workers Union, recognized that the political and tactical approaches of employers in their industries were likely to be different from
those adopted by employers in, for instance, the public sector and that appropriate union responses would therefore be different as well. Although
these unions were often criticized for fearing that a formal alliance with
white collar and public sector unions would constrain their "militant" actions, these unions were more concerned with being able to determine political and industrial tactics appropriate to their industries. This criticism,
mounted by those both within and outside the trade union movement, accepts the rhetoric that the strike and other forms of direct action were the

preferred tactic of these unions simply because they preferred disruption.
The criticism is inherently anti-union and is a surprising criticism to be
mounted by other unions. A more common critique from within the union
movement has been that these, primarily male, unions feared the influence
of the feminized public sector unions. Using pseudo-feminist arguments obscures real differences of need and opinion within the union movement.
The CTU's lack of resistance to the ECA and its passionate embrace of
what it called "strategic unionism"' was the final factor leading to the
emergence of a second national trade union umbrella grouping. Between
1987 and 1993, the trade union movement was led by the CTU, although a
number of unions remained independent. In 1993, twelve unions combined
to form a second national trade union center, the NZ Trade Union Federation. The Federation's members are drawn from two primary sources: first,
strategically placed and highly organized workers, such as seafarers, autoworkers, construction, and pulp and paper workers. The second source of
membership are unions from the increasingly marginalized segments of the
labor market or those where rates of unionization are uneven across the industry, such as those in clothing, footwear, clerical, hospitality, and other
trade service occupations, as well as forestry workers and others in the primary sector. With the exception of the Service Workers Union (SWU),
which represents workers in health care, janitorial, hospitality, and similar
industries, the CTU membership is drawn from unions whose members'

conditions most resemble standard employment. Although depicted by some
as "dinosaurs" hoping to retain the tactical responses of the old-style trade
union movement, held to be irrelevant in the post-Fordist, post-industrial

economy, the emergence of the TUF is a recognition of the uneven distribu-

27. Bramble and Heal define "strategic unionism" as "a commitment by unions to forsake workplace industrial action in return for access to political power." Tom Bramble &
Sarah Heal, Trade Unions, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW ZEALAND 119, 134 (Chris
Rudd & Brian Roper eds., 1997).
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tion of these trends towards postmodernity' with its variations in work
style. It is also a recognition that tactics appropriate to some sectors are
meaningless and useless in others. The tragedy of the CTU-TUF rupture is
that the core unions simply cannot recognize that their experience is not the
only experience, and have resisted efforts to build joint or cooperative approaches in response to common political issues.
This response points to the second source of pressure leading to the
CTU-TUF disjuncture. The CTU, and the private and public sector union
umbrella groupings before it, had adopted a consistently corporatist and statist response to workers' issues throughout the 1980s. Critics within the
broader trade union movement saw this approach as failing to mobilize the
influence that workers could have brought to bear on both politics and industry. As a result, the CTU leadership was seen as actively impeding
workers' organization and influence. The distinction at this point was between unions that retained a strong class identification and a "class struggle" approach to organizing and those claiming to be more "realistic" in
following the path of employer partnership. Politically, this distinction often, but not always, revealed itself through the parliamentary and party alliances of unions and their leaders.
Those dominant in the CTU also tended to be closely allied to the Labour Party and often seemed to be impelled by a need to ensure Labour's
electoral success even at the expense of their members' needs and interests.
This need was a prime factor in the Compact negotiated in the final months
of the fourth Labour Government. The Compact was an attempt to depict
the trade union movement as responsible and to effect some influence over
economic planning and policy. As such, it flew in the face of the overwhelming neo-liberal agenda. Tactical debates are regularly framed by a
discourse of union "responsibility." In other words, the preferred tactics
were those that would not label those in the labor movement as wild hotheads, and which would risk painting the Labour Party with the same brush.
This is not to say that association with the Labour Party necessarily produces these responses. The SWU has strong Labour Party links, yet remains
critical of many of the CTU approaches, while non-Labour activists often
advocate the "responsible" position within the CTU. Equally, many leading
members of the TUF have close Labour Party links, yet adopt a more critical and activist response. These "Labourist" tendencies are clearly moderated by the interests of workers within particular labour market segments.
Relations between the CTU and the TUF must, therefore, be read within this
complex political and economic dynamic.

28. This Paper uses this term in the sense it is used by DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION
OF POSTMODERNITY (Oxford, 1989).
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Second Wave of Attacks
This overview of the effects of the ECA and reconsideration of the tactical responses to the introduction of the ECA is not designed simply to
criticize the CTU or to justify the formation of the TUF. Pressure is mounting for amendments to the ECA in the wake of the formation of a conservative coalition government after the 1996 general election. Employer and big
business groups, especially the NZ Employers' Federation and the NZ Business Roundtable, are seeking the abolition of all specialist labor law in favor
of reliance on contract law alone. Indeed, as some commentators have described, "the campaign to abolish the specialist labour law jurisdiction and
its associated institutions is the unfinished agenda of labour market deregulation."29 This debate also centers around the common law-specialist law
disjuncture. Opponents of specialist institutions say that the legitimate role
of the law is to ensure that contracts are negotiated fairly and in accordance
with rules of common law, but that the content of the contracts should be
left up to the parties. In this view, specialist law is seen to have costs in
terms of freedom as well as economic costs where most organized groups of
workers do best outside of the regime. Conversely, advocates of specialist
law argue that common law is not an appropriate benchmark to assess success of specialist law while also invoking the historical evidence that the
application of a common law approach in the late nineteenth century was
found to be flawed, thus sparking the search for a new approach that resulted in specialist law. Different assumptions exist in regard to social, political, and economic power with the pro-common law argument assuming
an equitable relationship between employer and worker. Missing from these
debates is the question of whether specialist or any other courts benefit
workers.
The challenge to specialist employment law is gaining momentum despite the powers given employers in recent court rulings. The primary struggle at present centers on the role and future of the Employment Court. The
call from employers is that parliamentary power be invoked because the
Employment Court has recently handed down a few rulings that do not
clearly and exclusively meet their demands. Maxine Gay discussed this
movement at a recent seminar on the usefulness of the Court.30 The intensity
and depth of feeling about these contemporary concerns is reflected in the
tone of Part Two of this paper, largely based on that discussion.

29. ROSE RYAN & PAT WALSH, COMMON LAW VERSUS LABOUR LAW: THE DEBATE OVER
FUTURE OF THE SPECIALIST INSTITUTIONS 16 (VUW Working Papers in Industrial Relations 2/93, VUW Centre for Industrial Relations, 1993).
30. Maxine Gay, Is a Specialist Employment Court a Better Forum for Women? (Paper
presented as part of the N.Z. Institute of Public Law & N.Z. Institute for Dispute Resolution
series on Women & Employment Law, July 16, 1997).
THE
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PART II
THE USEFULNESS OF THE EMPLOYMENT COURT

(derived from a seminar given by Maxine Gay)31
It is impossible to address the question of the usefulness of the Employment Court without reference to time, place, or circumstance. While the
Employment Court is a better forum for workers than a general court, we
must also note that the Employment Court is created under the Employment
Contracts Act, one of the most pernicious and extreme pieces of industrial
legislation in the world. As an institution created by the ECA, asking
whether a specialist Employment Court is a better forum for workers is the
industrial equivalent of asking whether a specialist doctor is a better person
to perform female circumcision.
It seems, at times, that we in the trade union movement are developing
a starry-eyed view of the current Employment Court following some recent
judgments from that Court. To allow this view to dominate is to have too
short a memory. The current Chief Judge, in 1989, heavily fined a TUF affiliate for an alleged contempt of court. That affiliate, the Seafarers Union,
was exercising the internationally recognized right to strike. The same Chief
Judge was responsible, once the ECA was in force, for the infamous Alliance decision, which cemented in the most extreme aspects of the Act.32 The
union in the Alliance case requested the court to condemn various union
busting employer tactics, and the Court declined to do so. 3 The Court of
Appeal was left with the task of removing some of the harshness of the Alliance decision. 4 It is of little comfort to unions that the Employment Court
later repudiated its views. By that time, the damage was done.
A similar comment can be made in relation to partial lockouts. It was
this specialist court that endorsed the legality of such lockouts, where workers were held to be legally obliged to accept unilateral pay cuts. Two years
later, the Court reversed its decision and condemned such lockouts as
equivalent to serfdom, but by then substantial damage had been done. 5 Just
because some recent decisions of the Employment Court have sometimes
given some balance to the ECA, we tend to forget that the initial decisions
of this same Employment Court were even more extreme than the extremism of the ECA itself.
It is somewhat incongruous that the current more balanced approach of
the Employment Court was initially forced on it by the non-specialist Court
of Appeal. It is even more incongruous that the Court of Appeal, after
sending the Employment Court away on the path to rectify its previous er31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982.
Id.
Eketone v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783.
Wiltshire v. Presbyterian Support Services (Northern) [1994] 1 E.R.N.Z. 578.
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rors, then changed tack itself-a change which even caused one of its own
members, Judge Thomas, in Ivamy, to conclude that "it is not to be expected
that employers and employees alike may conclude that collective bargaining
in the''form recognized by the Employment Contracts Act is largely vitiate d . i
Given that we are not lawyers,37 we are probably more at liberty to
comment that the twists and turns of both the Employment Court and the
Court of Appeal on these matters seem to depend more on what is happening politically than on points of law. The intervention of the Court of Appeal in the decisions of the Employment Court just happened to coincide
with the complaint of the CTU to the International Labour Organization
about the violations of ILO conventions 87 and 98. Between the ILO upholding the complaint of the CTU and the ILO Direct Contact Mission, the
Court of Appeal, then the Employment Court, made a number of decisions
that moderated the extremes of the ECA and also the extremes of its own
previous decisions and those of the Employment Court. This action meant
that the ILO Direct Contact Mission was able to moderate the initial findings of the ILO on the Complaint. However, soon after the report of the ILO
Direct Contact Mission had been made, the Court of Appeal made an abrupt
about-face of which Ivamy is the prime example.
The Employment Court has largely failed to meet the needs of women
workers in matters of specific concern to them, primarily pay equity/comparable worth and sexual harassment. Wendy Davis has noted that
"the gender bias of decision makers has resulted in decisions which perpetuate male power and privilege, disregard the interests of women, and
threaten to undermine the objects of the legislation which make sexual harassment unlawful."39 Three years later, Caroline Sarah Morris, in a report
prepared for the Employment Court, noted that "although the poor record
documented by Wendy Davis from 1991 to 1993 seems to have improved
there is still a distinct trend to undervaluation of the hurt experienced by
women in the events leading to a personal grievance claim." She continues
with the following:
Women seem to have to suffer more than men in order to receive the same
amount of compensation, and when the comments discussing worker distress are analysed, similar amounts are made to men and women who suffer differing emotional consequences from their personal grievances. This
trend is consistent from 1991-1995 and occurs in both unjustified dis36. N.Z. Fire Service Commission v. Ivamy [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85.
37. See supra note 30. This symposium and the seminar series from which this paper is
drawn both feature authors who are practicing attorneys directing their writing to a legal
audience.
38. See supra note 36.
39. Wendy Davis, Feminist Perspective on Sexual Harassment in Employment Law in
New Zealand (unpublished LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1993)
(on file with author).
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missal actions and sexual harassment cases.40
The Court is largely failing to recognize the specific concerns and
needs of women in cases that include a sexual harassment claim. This
problem is also evident in questions of employment equity. Lorraine
Skiffington says:
[T]he specialist employment jurisdiction has failed to deliver employment
equity to women employees... and that rather than breaking down barriers to employment equity the Employment Contracts Act has given employers more scope to exploit women.... While the specialist employment jurisdiction provides several avenues to address employment
inequities, law is fundamentally reactive and incremental, providing limited remedies for the few cases brought before it.... Importantly it must
not be forgotten that employment law is created by male legislators and
presided over by a wholly male judiciary... the Chief Judge has publicly
stated that the next three appointments should be women to reflect the
gender mix of the workplace.
Skiffington concludes by stating that "until this happens little progress
is likely to emanate from employment law."42 It is, however, not just a question of the gender mix in the Court. The abolition of the Employment Equity
Act was justified as a step to allow the "market to determine incomes."
Women's marginalized position within the labor force and the segmentary
nature of the labor market means that employers have everything to gain
from keeping women's incomes lower than men's, even where they perform
substantially the same functions. Equal pay, forced on employers by legislation, did not significantly close the earnings gap because employers were
able to use mechanisms such as job redefinition and workplace reform style
processes to reinforce women's marginalization. Without a legislative base
to build a case for employment equity, the Court cannot and will not bring
about any significant change.
If within the context of the ECA the Employment Court fails both men
and women workers, why do we say that in general terms the Employment
Court is better for workers? First, let us consider some of the arguments put
forward for the abolition of the Employment Court. In August 1996, the NZ
Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation jointly published a
study by Bernard Robertson on the Status and Jurisdiction of the New Zealand Employment Court. In a typical piece of BRT/EF tautology, this study
begins by claiming that any specialist court "constitutes an interference with
the independence of the judiciary. 43 It then claims that the ECA "breaches
40. Caroline Sarah Morris, An Investigation into Gender Bias in the Employment Institutions (Interim Report prepared for the Employment Court, Feb. 1996).
41. Lorraine Skiffington, Employment Equity - Unfinished Business 13 (Paper presented at Closing the Gap: A Forum on Equal Pay, Wellington, June 1997).
42. 1& at 13, 14.
43. BERNARD ROBERTSON, STATUS AND JURISDICTION OF THE NEw ZEALAND EMPLOYMENr COURT vii (N.Z. Business Roundtable & Employers' Association, Wellington,
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fundamental constitutional principles" by depriving private citizens the right
of access to "ordinary courts" and that the role of the Court of Appeal in
employment law undermines the arguments for a separate jurisdiction. Robertson concludes that "the only solution which avoids creating disputes and
which preserves the principles of free contracting, the independence of the
judiciary and the equal application of the law is the abolition of the specialist employment jurisdiction."" John Timmins, an Auckland barrister, takes
issue with Robertson, seeing his case as "surely specious." He continues:
It ignores the existence of a raft of specialist courts including, for instance,
the Family Court, the Children and Young Persons Court, and the Planning Tribunal (now renamed the Environment Court). There is no magic
status of the High Court; rather it is the constitutional role of the courts
generally that is important to the fabric of our society. Certainly the Court
of Appeal has had no hesitation in holding that the Employment Court is
Mr. Robertson's premise to its
clearly one of the Queens' Courts. To take 45
logical conclusion is to result in absurdities.
New Zealand has a long tradition of jurisdictions specific to certain circumstances. Specialist employment law is a recognition of the complexity
and particularity of the issues involved. Not only would the abolition of the
Employment Court on the grounds advocated by Robertson imply logical
absurdities, but it would also reinforce employer power over workers in the
most absolute way.
The current debate on the need or not for a specialist Employment
Court is not really about the Court. In reality, it is nothing other than camouflage for the broader and even more sinister agenda of the new right forces.
Jane Kelsey recently exposed part of this agenda by identifying two underlying motives for the attack on the Employment Court.46 The first is the desire to extend neo-liberal hegemony from the bureaucracy, government,
media, and private sector to the judiciary. The second is the desire to reinforce the myth that there is a "level playing field" in employment. This desire is shown in the move to treat employment contracts under the terms of
ordinary contract law.4
The extent to which this agenda is unfinished was shown in 1996 with
the publication of a BRT/EF publication opposing unjustified dismissal provisions. In this, Baird argues that, although the ECA is a "giant step toward
the restoration of freedom of contract in New Zealand labour markets," it
has some deficiencies. ' As he sees it, "the principle [sic] deficiency of the
Aug. 1996).
44. Id. at viii.
45. John Timmins, Courts Have Their ConstitutionalRights, NAT'L Bus. REV., Sept. 20,
1996.
46. Jane Kelsey, Mad Max and the Future of the ECA, LABOUR NoTEs, Mar. 1997, at 6,

7.
47. Id.

48.

CHARLEs

W.

BAIRD, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
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ECA is its mandate for unjustifiable dismissal restrictions in all employment
contracts, collective and individual. Prior to the ECA, only unionized workers were 'protected' by mandatory unjustifiable dismissal restrictions." 9
Baird argues in favor of "at-will" employment contracts where either party
has the right to sever an employment relationship, which would require the
ending of unjustified dismissal provisions statutorily required as part of all
employment contracts.50 The argument relies on the assumption that workers
and employers negotiate as equal parties, and calls the notion of unequal
bargaining power a "hoary myth."'" Yet Baird is concerned with maintaining
employer power, criticizing unjustified dismissal provisions as effectively
transferring job property rights from employers to employees.
These demands for a second wave of industrial relations reform are articulated as attacks on judicial functions in disputes and the ability to fire at
will-both of which are involved in Baird's case against unjustified dismissal provisions. Recent Court rulings suggest that judicial interpretations
of the ECA have significantly met the demands of these employer groups. In
the recent Court of Appeal case, Principalof Auckland College of Education vs. Hagg, the Court ruled that non-renewal of a fixed-term contract did
not constitute dismissal and could not therefore be considered unjustified
dismissal.52 This interpretation of the ECA seems to apply even where a
worker has been employed on a series of fixed-term contracts which are
used to avoid the obligations of long-term employment. In other words,
fixed-term agreements to breach the requirements of the ECA appear to be
prima facie legal. The majority judgment of the Court in this case recognized the potential for an entire workforce to be employed on a series of
fixed-term contracts, but recognizing that this view may violate article 2(3)
of ILO Convention 158, the Court observed that it was not its place to remedy such a breach. Given that there is now no legal impediment to a series
of fixed-term contracts and that good evidence exists that these contracts
may be outside the limited protections of the ECA, the business case for
amendments to the ECA seems to have lost its basis. The ECA provides almost no protection to workers, and the position of workers in marginal portions of New Zealand's increasingly segmented labor market has become
even more precarious.
The campaign of the Business Round Table, Employers Federation, and
the National New Zealand First Coalition Government against the Employment Court and its Chief Judge for "judicial activism" must also be seen as
part of the wider campaign for the abolition of personal grievance procedures and the introduction of "fire-at-will" employment. Employer attacks
on the Employment Court, therefore, are part of a campaign to introduce
MISSAL: THE EcONOMIC OFAN UNJUST EMPLOYMENT TAx v-vii (Wellington, 1996).

49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Unreported, C.A. 230/96 (Mar. 26, 1997).
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completely casualized employment. As so often before, the forces of the
new right have used the Business Round Table as the storm troopers of this
old employment philosophy dressed up as a new concept. The Employers
Federation has, as usual, been somewhat more moderate in its demands,
seeking such a "fire-at-will" system of employment only for the first two
years of a worker's employment. The Coalition Government sits as the referee in this debate, dedicating itself to amend the ECA to bring greater
"fairness, flexibility and neutrality."
In one of his initial speeches on this matter, two years ago on July 22,
1995, Roger Kerr, Executive Director of the Business Round Table, espoused the need to change the current "dismissal with a cause" system with
what he termed an "employment at will" system." In so doing, he quoted
from U.S. Judge Richard Posner in a 1989 Cardozo Law Review article:
Employment at will is a corollary of freedom of contract, and freedom of
contract is a social policy with a host of economic and social justifications. Employment at will happens to be the logical terminus on the road
that begins with slavery and makes intermediate stops at serfdom, indentured servitude, forced servitude and guild restrictions. That should be a
point in its favor.5 4
What a triumph of obfuscation! This is what happens to the free marketeers who reject the need for any plan or map. They think they have arrived at the terminus of a road that begins with slavery when in fact they
have gone in full circle and ended up from where they have started.
Is the Specialist Employment Court a better forum for workers? The
answer must be "no" if we compare it to the Arbitration Court of the Industrial Relations Act, or even the Labour Court of the Labour Relations Act.
The Arbitration Court had the ability to make "awards," which ensured that
the most vulnerable of workers received wages and conditions well in advance of what the market would have provided. The Arbitration Court was
the instrument of the implementation of equal pay in the 1960s and 1970s.
The answer must be a resounding "yes" if we compare it to what the Business Round Table and the Employers Federation have in mind for us. Their
abolition campaign is part of an attempt to bring the entire judiciary to heel,
to eliminate any aspect of the human element from employment law, and to
reduce it simply to an aspect of ordinary contract law. It is part of an attempt to abolish personal grievance procedures and to replace the current
"dismissal with cause" system with "dismissal at will" to completely casualize the New Zealand workforce. It is an attempt to remove the last vestige
of employment security that workers in New Zealand have. If the terminus
for worker rights is no rights at all, what does that say about our society as
53. Roger Kerr, Appeals to the Privy Council, New Zealand Bar Association Conference
(July 1995).
54. Id. at 2 (citing Richard Posner, Hegel and Employment at Will: A Comment, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1625-36 (1989)).
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we move into the twenty-first century?
CONCLUSION
Since 1984, an ongoing employer assault on the New Zealand working
class has met only minimal resistance from the trade union movement and,
since 1987, its primary national trade union center, the CTU. The CTU and
its model unions are now so compromised that they are unlikely to be able
to marshal workers' forces to mount effectively a new stage in the war of
position to resist the attacks from the employers organizations and the newright ideological hegemony. Clearly, new approaches are necessary that reflect the range of circumstances within which workers find themselves. The
trade union movement, as the voice of working people, needs to return to
the principles of mutual solidarity and support. It needs to reach out to marginal sectors of the workforce, to unemployed workers and other beneficiaries, to build alliances with others suffering under the structural adjustment
program. In short, a desperate need exists for tactical and strategic innovation that moves beyond corporatist unionism and is based in active struggle
against the continual weakening of working class power. The CTU does not
seem able or willing to provide that leadership. There is every likelihood
that working people will respond well to new organizations and new systems reflecting their needs as the suffering imposed through the New Zealand structural adjustment program continues. The New Zealand Trade Union Federation, although still in its infancy, is committed to building a block
of genuine and independent trade unions and to organizing and advocating
on behalf of its members and the working class as a whole.
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